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Horses in World War II were used by the belligerent nations for transportation of troops, artillery, materiel, and, to a lesser extent, in mobile cavalry troops. The role of horses for each nation depended on its military strategy and state of economy and was most pronounced in German and Soviet ground forces. Over the course of the war Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union employed more than six million horses. Most British regular cavalry regiments were mechanised between 1928 and the outbreak of World War II. The United States retained a single cavalry regiment stationed in the Philippines, and the German Army retained a single brigade. The French Army of 1939–1940 blended horse regiments into their mobile divisions, while the Red Army of 1941 had thirteen cavalry divisions. Italian, Japanese, Polish and Romanian armies employed substantial cavalry formations. Horse-drawn transportation was most important for Germany, as it was relatively lacking in natural oil resources. Infantry and horse-drawn artillery formed the bulk of the German Army throughout the war; only one-fifth of the Army belonged to mobile panzer and mechanized divisions. Each German infantry division employed thousands of horses and thousands of men taking care of them. Despite losses of horses to enemy action, exposure and disease, Germany maintained a steady supply of work and saddle horses until 1945. Cavalry in the Army and the SS gradually increased in size, peaking at six cavalry divisions in February 1945. The Red Army was substantially motorized from 1939–1941 but lost most of its war equipment in Operation Barbarossa. These losses were temporarily remedied by forming masses of mounted infantry which were used as strike forces in the Battle of Moscow. Heavy casualties and a shortage of horses soon compelled the Soviets to reduce the number of cavalry divisions. As tank production and Allied supplies made up for the losses of 1941, the cavalry was merged with tank units, forming more effective strike groups. From 1943–1944, cavalry gradually became the mobile infantry component of the tank armies. By the end of the war Soviet cavalry was reduced to its pre-war strength. The logistical role of horses in the Red Army was not as high as it was in the German Army due to Soviet domestic oil reserves and American truck supplies. ==Motorization in the interwar period== The trench warfare of the Western Front of World War I resulted in a strategic stalemate: defensive weapons and tactics prevailed over the offensive options available. Early tanks, supported by artillery and foot infantry, provided a weapon for breaching the front line but were too slow to turn the breach into a strategic offensive; the railroads of France and Germany provided the defending side with the ability to move troops and counterattack in sufficient time. Postwar armies concentrated on developing more effective offensive tactics through the mechanization of ground troops. The mechanization strategy was influenced by the state of economies, anticipated scenarios of war, politics and lobbying within civilian governments and the militaries. The United Kingdom, France and Germany chose three different strategies. A fourth option was chosen by the Soviet Union who, influenced by the mobile warfare experience of the Russian Civil War and the Polish-Soviet War, introduced a mechanized corps and airborne troops.〔Millett, p. 29〕 Each strategy closed the gap between the capabilities of cavalry and mechanized infantry. Another factor prompting motorization was the decline of national horse stocks and the inability to restore them in reasonable time.〔 Of all the major powers, only the United Kingdom, weakened by the loss of Ireland, was in part ''compelled'' to motorize for this reason; horse stocks in Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union remained sufficient for at least their peacetime armies.〔 In 1928 the United Kingdom became the first nation to begin the replacement of horse cavalry with motorized troops〔Gudmundsson, p. 56.〕 and by 1939 had become the first to motorize their national army, although some Yeomanry regiments plus regular cavalry units serving overseas remained mounted.〔Murray and Millett, p. 46.〕 British experimental armored units had performed impressively since 1926,〔Murray and Millett, p. 25.〕 but, facing resistance from the traditional branches of service, remained unpopular among top brass until the Battle of France.〔Murray and Millett, pp. 26–27.〕 The French Army partially motorized their cavalry in 1928, creating divisions of ''dragons porte'' (mobile dragoons) that combined motorized and horse-mounted elements.〔Gudmundsson, p. 58.〕 In the following decade the French searched for a perfect mix, testing five different divisional configurations.〔Jarymowycz 2008, p. 163.〕 Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania followed the French mixed pattern; Austrian and Czechoslovak mobile divisions were similar but with a higher share of horses.〔 The Polish army acquired tanks and the Lithuanian army acquired trucks but otherwise both remained horse-powered, World War I style armies.〔Liekis, p. 325〕 The United States Cavalry commanders approved the French strategy〔 but made no radical changes until the 1940 reform that completely eliminated horse troops. German analysts rejected the French concept of mixed horse-and-motor troops as unworkable.〔 The Wehrmacht had its own opponents of mechanization, but with Adolf Hitler's support Ludwig Beck,〔 Werner von Fritsch〔Beck and von Fritsch secured resources and provided full administrative support for Guderian's panzer project – Murray and Millett, p.41. Guderian's own memoirs paint Beck as a backward anti-panzer general, perhaps a reaction to Beck's involvement in the plot against Hitler – Murray and Millett, p. 42.〕 and Heinz Guderian succeeded in forging a compact but effective panzer force that coexisted with masses of traditional foot infantry and horse-drawn artillery throughout World War II.〔Mobile panzer troops did not exceed 20% of the whole German Army headcount – Murray and Millett, p. 46.〕〔Jarymowycz 2008, p. 165.〕 Willis Crittenberger observed that "the French are limited to the armored division, while the Germans have created an armored branch."〔Jarymowycz 2008, p. 162.〕 By 1939 the Wehrmacht disbanded their 18 cavalry regiments, leaving a single active cavalry brigade; the cavalrymen with their war horses were integrated into infantry divisions.〔 Motorization of the 1930s raised a number of concerns, starting with the need to secure a continuous fuel supply. The new formations had a significantly larger footprint on the march: the 1932 French motorized division took up 52 kilometers of road space compared to 11.5 kilometers for a horse-mounted formation, raising concerns about control and vulnerability.〔 The Spanish Civil War and other conflicts of 1930s did not provide definite solutions and the issues remained unresolved until the onset of World War II. Only the German blitzkrieg achieved in the Battle of France finally persuaded the militaries of the world, including the United States, that the tank had replaced the horse on the battlefield.〔Jarymowycz 2008, p. 175.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Horses in World War II」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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